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tant class of historical counterfactuals and give formally rigorous truth conditions
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1. Introduction
This paper is a contribution to the analysis of counterfactuals. Like
Bennett (2003, 12), by a counterfactual we mean a subjunctive condi-
tional with a false antecedent. Typical examples of counterfactuals are
the following (it should be a simple matter to supply an appropriate
context):
If this coin had shown heads, I would have won my bet.(1)
If this were a ruby, it would be red.(2)
Following Lewis (1973), we will be using “A 2→ C” to stand for “If
it were the case that A, it would be the case that C”.1 Antecedent A
and consequent C are taken to be declarative sentences in the indicative
mood; thus we take the subjunctive mood to be part of the connective.
In our paper, we will be investigating truth conditions for counterfac-
tuals. Some writers, most prominently Dorothy Edgington (1995, 2004),
have argued that giving truth conditions for any form of conditionals is
a misguided project. In this debate we side with Bennett (2003, 253ff.),
who argues that even if it makes no sense to give truth conditions for
indicative conditionals, giving truth conditions for counterfactuals is a
much more reasonable project.
2In giving truth conditions for counterfactuals, it is natural to start
with the intuition that one should evaluate the consequent in a scenario
that does not deviate much from actuality while making the (actually
false) antecedent true. Thus, A 2→ C is true iff2 C is true in the
scenario that is most similar to actuality while making A true. This
intuition has been spelled out in various ways, e.g., by Stalnaker (1968)
and Lewis (1973).3 Most authors agree that in a successful analysis the
following three notions will play a crucial role: the intuitive concept of
“scenario” should be explained in terms of histories (sometimes called
just worlds), forks should describe in a localized manner how histories
start to deviate, and the evolution of worlds before and after a fork
should be smooth. The notion of similarity that is operative in the
analysis may be either basic or derivable from these notions.
It is often taken for granted that counterfactuals form a single species
and thus, that a single, unified analysis would apply to all of them. That
unified analysis is often additionally required to be neutral with respect
to a number of controversial issues like determinism vs. indeterminism
and the question of whether indexical elements play a role in coun-
terfactuals. The subsequent formal development has shown that if a
unified approach is used, the analysis has to be vague. The assumption
of uniformity has accordingly been challenged by some writers (e.g.,
Barker 2003, Bennett 2003, 284ff.). It seems that one can either give
a vague, general analysis of counterfactuals or aim at a more rigorous
analysis of a subclass of counterfactuals.
In this paper, we will give a rigorous analysis of the class of what
we call historical counterfactuals. Such counterfactuals are important
in real life situations (“If you had told me the meeting was canceled,
I wouldn’t have come”), including attributions of agency, praise and
blame (“Shame on you: if you hadn’t squandered all the money, we
would be having a nice dinner now”) and singular causation (“If the
match hadn’t been struck, it wouldn’t have lit”). In singling out this
class, the key notion is that of real, or historical, possibility. We claim
that for the class of historical counterfactuals, formally rigorous truth
conditions can be given in the framework of branching space-times.
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we will sharpen the
distinction between historical and non-historical counterfactuals and
explain the concepts involved in the analysis of historical ones. This
discussion will also motivate the development of our formal machinery
in sections 3–5. Thus, in section 3, we present the framework of branch-
ing space-times, which we use to define a notion of similarity, called
“comparative closeness”, in section 4. In section 5, we specify a formal
language whose semantics is based on these developments. In section 6,
we will discuss the merits of our approach. Appendix A considers an
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3alternative analysis of counterfactuals in branching space-times, which
is due to Nuel Belnap.
2. Historical and non-historical counterfactuals
2.1. Historical possibility
In philosophical discussions of modality it is commonly conceded that
we can employ a variety of notions of possibility. E.g., there is logical
possibility (meaning the absence of contradiction), there are various
nomic possibilities (e.g., physical possibility understood as conformity
to the laws of physics), etc. We hold that for the analysis of counter-
factuals the notion of historical possibility is crucial.4
Historical possibilities are everywhere. Consider the fact that you
had coffee this morning. (If you didn’t, supply a different example.)
With respect to this very occasion of your having breakfast, it is true
that you could have skipped the coffee. For a different example of the
same sort, please move your arm now. Thank you. Certainly you could
have not moved your arm on this very occasion.—For examples of
a different flavor, consider last week’s lottery numbers. At the very
occasion on which these numbers were drawn, different numbers could
have been drawn.5
As our examples show, historical possibilities presuppose indeter-
minism: real indeterminism of the world we live in, not to be confused
with unpredictability, indeterminism of theories or other epistemologi-
cal notions. We presuppose that some situations can really continue in
more than one alternative way. By saying this, we have taken sides in an
enormous debate about determinism and indeterminism. Many writers
on counterfactuals have assumed that a good theory of counterfactuals
must be neutral with regard to this debate, or that it has to presuppose
determinism. To us, this appears to be misguided.6
In fact, analyses of counterfactuals in the presence of determinism
like in Lewis (1973) strike us as involving double talk: The worlds are
assumed to be deterministic, but there are so-called “miracles” that
are supposed to produce worlds that are minimally different from the
actual world while coinciding with actuality in the whole past. Such
worlds are ruled out by determinism: assuming determinism, if initial
segments of worlds coincide, so do the worlds as wholes. Yet, a notion
of (localized) “miracles” is required to make sense of the idea that
worlds were alike in their past but later started to deviate. It turns
out that Lewisian “miracles” have exactly the same formal structure
as the indeterminism in the branching space-times models that we will
employ, being localized at single space-time points.7
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Some counterfactuals clearly involve historical possibility, and some
clearly do not. E.g., the betting example above (1) appeals to historical
possibility. To determine its truth value in a given scenario, one has to
consider whether in the closest historically possible scenario in which
the antecedent holds, i.e., in which the coin landed heads, I won my
bet. Thus, if in fact I bet on heads and the coin that was tossed could
have shown heads,8 the counterfactual will be true. If no such historical
possibility exists, we do not know what to say. Things are different in
the ruby example (2): If something is not a ruby, then there is no
historical possibility of that very thing’s being a ruby.9 However, in
evaluating counterfactual (2), historical possibilities are not an issue:
the counterfactual is evaluated in what Bennett (2003, 284) calls the
“direct” manner, merely as an instance of the generalization “All rubies
are red”. We share Bennett’s diagnosis that “direct” counterfactuals,
which we prefer to call “non-historical”, are “uninteresting—because
unchallenging—as a philosophical topic” (2003, 287).10
We also agree that some sentences may be interpreted as historical or
non-historical counterfactuals, depending on context. To use Bennett’s
example (2003, 285), consider the following:
If Charles had been CEO of Enron, the accounting fraud
would not have lasted a week.
(3)
This sentence will normally be interpreted non-historically, describing
the actual financial abilities of Charles: He is too inept at handling
money to invent and sustain something as intricate as the Enron fraud.
The counterfactual will be true if and only if Charles is in fact finan-
cially inept. However, the sentence may also be interpreted historically,
taking us back to a time in the past when Charles might have chosen a
different career. On this reading, Charles’s current financial inability is
not relevant—whether (3) is true depends on the existence of historical
possibilities through which Charles would have become the CEO of
Enron and on the attitude he would have had toward the fraud then.
In fact, it appears to us that borderline cases between historical
and non-historical counterfactuals are quite common. Consider, e.g.,
Lewis’s notorious kangaroo sentence,
If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over.(4)
An historical reading would have to consider evolution, facing difficult
questions of species identity, while a non-historical reading might, e.g.,
point out the importance of tails for the kangaroos’ balancing. But even
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clearly historical counterfactuals.
2.3. Historical counterfactuals at work
In order to illustrate the uses of historical counterfactuals, we start
by slowly unrolling the betting example (1) from above. We will en-
counter some problems along the way. Solving these problems is the
main objective of the formal theory that we develop below.
Our betting example is the following: U bet on heads and the coin
was tossed, showing tails. On seeing the result, U exclaimed: “If the coin
had shown heads, I would have won my bet”. In this case, intuitions
are quite clear: The counterfactual is true. Why is that so?
At the event of utterance e, the antecedent A (“the coin showed
heads”) is false, and so is the consequent C (“I won my bet”). The
utterance is a conditional in the subjunctive mood with a false an-
tecedent, so it qualifies as a counterfactual according to our definition.
Both antecedent and consequent are sentences in the past tense that
are evaluated at e, thus indexically referring to events earlier than e.
Apart from tense, a further source of indexicality in the example is
the use of the pronoun “I” in the consequent. Since the counterfactual
is clearly not an instance of a generalization, it has to be evaluated
historically. Which histories need to be considered? There is the actual
history up to e, which is fixed by the event of utterance, e, and which
comprises e’s actual past (in which, to repeat, both the antecedent and
the consequent are false).11 Apart from the actual history up to e, we
need to consider other histories in which the antecedent A is true (so-
called A-histories). There is a history in which everything was as it
actually was, except for minute details of the tossing which led to the
coin’s showing heads. There is also a history in which the coin landed
heads and additionally, while the coin was up in the air, I changed
my bet from heads to tails, and there are many other histories making
the antecedent true. Now the intuitive recipe for assessing the truth
value of our counterfactual is this: A 2→ C is true just in case at the
A-history that is closest to actuality, C is true. Intuitively, the closest
A-history is the one we mentioned first, involving only the minimal
changes required to make A true. Since in this world, U still bet on
heads and the coin landed heads, U won her bet, making C and thus,
the counterfactual, come out true.
In our description, we have skipped one crucial detail: Since we are
dealing with indexical sentences, we need to specify where they are to
be evaluated. A 2→ C obviously has to be evaluated at e, the event of
utterance. But where do we evaluate A and C in histories other than
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After all, e does not belong to the histories that we mentioned. In order
to answer the question, we need to specify, for each non-actual history,
an event e′ at which A and C can be evaluated in order to assess the
counterfactual. Our guiding idea will be to specify, for each history, a
“counterpart” of event e that has the same spatio-temporal location as
e. Then we will evaluate A and C with respect to these counterparts
e′. Thus, semi-formally, A 2→ C is true at e iff at the history closest
to actuality at whose e′, A is true, C is true at e′ as well. Apart from
making this fully rigorous, further tasks are to clarify what a history
is, which notion of forks among histories is appropriate, and how to
analyze the intuitive notion of similarity.
In the following three sections we will give our answers to these
questions. As a background theory, we will sketch the framework of
branching space-times (Belnap 1992). In this indeterministic frame-
work, histories are something like maximally consistent sets of possible
point events. Histories branch at points, thus providing a localized no-
tion of forks. The spatio-temporal ordering of these branching points al-
lows us to define a notion of comparative closeness. The notion of “same
spatio-temporal location” will be implemented as an order-preserving
equivalence relation. Thus, the framework that we will develop allows
us to specify a formal semantics for the limited, but important class of
historical counterfactuals.
3. Branching space-times
3.1. Basic branching space-times
We will use Belnap’s (1992) theory of branching space-times (BST) to
build a semantics for historical counterfactuals. BST is a version of a
possible worlds theory that combines indeterminism with relativistic
space-times. The role of possible worlds is played in BST by histories,
which however, in contrast to Lewis’s possible worlds, share initial
segments. Technically, the point of departure is a partially ordered
non-empty set W = 〈W,6〉, from which histories are to be carved.
The elements of W are thought of as spatio-temporal point-like events.
The relation a 6 b is interpreted as meaning that a is in the causal
past of b, or, equivalently, that b is in a possible future of a. a < b is
short for (a 6 b and a 6= b). In a tensed language, one may say that W
consists of all (point) events that occurred, or could have occurred, are
occurring or might be occurring, and might occur in the future; this
licenses calling W Our World.
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forks characterized by x < y, x < z and y and z incomparable by
6, and downward forks characterized by y < x, z < x and y and z
incomparable by 6. An upward fork can mean one of two things: (1)
y and z belong to alternative possible futures of x or (2) x belongs
to the common past of causally unconnectable (space-like separated)
y and z. In contrast, a downward fork has only one sensible reading,
namely, causally unconnectable y and z belong to the past of x. This
intuition, that any three events forming a downward fork belong to
a history, motivates the following definition of history. It first defines
upward directed subsets of W , and secondly identifies histories with
maximal upward directed subsets of W :
Definition 1 (upward directed subset and history)
A is an upward directed subset ofW if for any x, y ∈ A there is a z ∈ A
such that x 6 z and y 6 z. And h is a history in W if h is a maximal
upward directed subset of W .
In BST models there can be point events that belong to one history,
but which are incomparable by the ordering 6. Using a term from
physics, such events are called space-like separated:
Definition 2 (space-like separation)
Two point events a, b of 〈W,6〉 are space-like separated iff (1) there is
a history h in W such that a ∈ h and b ∈ h and (2) neither a 6 b nor
b 6 a.
To introduce some notation, Hist stands for the set of histories of W ,
and H[E]
df
= {h ∈ Hist | E ⊂ h}. For E = {e}, the notation H(e) is
used. In BST, histories branch, and a relevant notion is undividedness.
Intuitively, we think of two histories as undivided at event e provided
that the two share some event above e.
Definition 3 (undividedness)
For g, h ∈ H(e), g and h are undivided at a point event e, g ≡e h, iff g
and h share some point properly above e, if there are any.
If two histories containing e are not undivided at a given event e,
we say they are divided at e. BST’s postulates then guarantee that (1)
undividedness at e is an equivalence relation on the set H(e) of histories
containing e, and that (2) any two distinct histories are divided at
some event.12 With respect to the notion of accessibility, which plays
a prominent role in other possible-worlds-frameworks, we can thus say
that any two histories are accessible one from the other.
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i.e., maximal elements in their intersection:
Definition 4 (choice points)
For histories g and h of W , if g 6= h then the set Cgh of choice points
for histories g and h is the set of maximal elements of g ∩h. Otherwise
Cgh = ∅.
A particular realization of BST is a Minkowskian branching struc-
ture, in which all histories are Minkowski space-times.13 Figure 1 il-
lustrates branching of two histories in two cases: (A) with a single
choice point and (B) with two choice points. The region of points
space-like separated from the choice points belongs to both histories,






Figure 1. (A) Two histories g and h separate at a single choice point c. (B) Separa-
tion at two choice points c and d. The shadowed regions indicate where the histories
g and h overlap. The ‘surfaces of divergence’, represented by broken lines, do not
belong to the region of overlap, but the choice points do.
3.2. BST extended: locations and properties
As we will show in section 4, basic BST permits one to define com-
parative closeness of histories via the ordering of their choice points.
Yet, the theory is too austere to yield informative counterfactuals—
appendix A shows what the problems are. Accordingly, we will extend
the theory of branching space-times, and will do it in two steps: we will
first introduce same locations and then properties.
Same location Recall that events of W are point-like concrete par-
ticulars. As we pointed out, for the assessment of the constituents of
a counterfactual we need to be able to say, of two events of W, that
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the following way (cf. Mu¨ller 2005):
Definition 5 (BST with spatio-temporal locations)
A triple 〈W,6, L〉 is a model of branching space-times with locations
if 〈W,6〉 is a BST model and L is an equivalence relation on W such
that
1. for each history h in W and for each equivalence class [l], l ∈ W ,
the intersection h ∩ [l] contains exactly one element, and
2. L respects the ordering, i.e., for [l] and [l′] equivalence classes and
h1 and h2 histories, [l]∩ h1 = [l
′]∩ h1 iff [l]∩ h2 = [l
′]∩ h2, and the
same for < and >.
If point-events x and y are members of the same equivalence class [l],
we say that they have the same spatio-temporal location.
The construction of a Minkowskian branching structure, mentioned
above, guarantees that locations can be introduced.14
In what follows, we always assume that we are working with Min-
kowskian branching structures. Thus, the set of locations, which is the
quotient structure S
df
= W/L, is Minkowski space-time. This means
that (1) we have available vectors connecting any two locations and (2)
these vectors can be classified as spacelike, timelike or lightlike in the
standard manner.
Properties So far, we can talk about point events and their location,
but not about their properties. Still, this will be needed in assessing
counterfactuals.15 Intuitively, it could be said that in a BST model,
properties are already there, since the elements of W are pictured
as concrete point-like particulars. Formally, these properties are taken
from a set P, and are made available for the semantics of our language
in the following way:
Definition 6 (property assignment)
A property assignment is a function A :W → PowP, where P is a set
of properties.
Thus, each point is assigned a set of properties.
BST-structures that include both locations and property ascriptions
are called BST+L+A-structures, they are quintuples 〈W,6, L,P, A〉
with L, P, and A as just explained.
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4. Comparative closeness
The BST framework makes it possible to define similarity of histories as
comparative closeness. The underlying intuition is that histories are the
closer the later they branch.16 Comparative closeness is thus defined in
terms of the locations of choice points.
We will now first give a definition of global comparative closeness,
comparing histories without taking into account the event of utterance
of a counterfactual. It will turn out that many histories must be treated
as incomparable (Section 4.1). In a second step, we will use the event of
utterance to define a local notion of comparative closeness (Section 4.2).
The formal properties of the closeness ordering will be the same in both
cases: we will define families of partial orderings ∠h that can be used
in a formal semantics for counterfactuals.17
4.1. Global comparative closeness
Given a reference history h and two histories f and g with respective
sets of choice points Cfh and Cgh, our task now is to define when the
relation f∠hg holds, i.e., when f is strictly closer to h than g. In order
to proceed systematically, we reason by cases based on the size of the
sets Cfh and Cgh, starting with the ‘0–0’ case where both Cfh and Cgh
have zero elements:
0-0 As Cfh = ∅ = Cgh, the histories f = g = h. Consequently, neither
f∠hg nor g∠hf .
0-1 Cfh = ∅, thus, f = h. As g 6= h, we have f∠hg.
1-1 Let Cfh = {c}, Cgh = {d}. We need to distinguish three cases:
(A) c = d: f and g are tied with respect to closeness to h, since
they split off at the same point. Thus, neither f∠hg nor g∠hf .
(B) c < d: g∠hf , because g branches off from h at d, which is later
than c. (The case d < c is symmetrical.)
(C) c and d are space-like separated: Since c and d are incompa-
rable, the histories f and g are also counted as incomparable
with respect to h, i.e., neither f∠hg nor g∠hf .
0-2 As in the 0-1 case, f∠hg.
1-2 Let Cfh = {c}, Cgh = {d1, d2}. We need to distinguish six cases,
which are illustrated in Figure 2(A)–(F):
(A) c = d1: f∠hg, since there is a region in f ∩ h that is not in
g ∩ h. (c = d2 is symmetrical.)















Figure 2. The six subcases to be considered for the 1-2 case.
(B) c < d1 and c < d2: g∠hf , since g branches off after f .
(C) d1 < c and d2 < c: f∠hg, since f branches off after g.
(D) c < d1, and c and d2 are space-like separated: Due to the space-
like separation, f and g are incomparable w.r.t. h: neither f∠hg
nor g∠hf (symmetrically for d2).
(E) d1 < c, and c and d2 are space-like separated: f∠hg, since f
branches off after g (symmetrically for d2). (C) is a special case
of this.
(F) c and d1 as well as c and d2 are space-like separated: Due to
the space-like separation, f and g are incomparable w.r.t. h:
neither f∠hg nor g∠hf .
(The case d1 < c < d2 cannot occur, since d1 and d2 are space-like
separated.)
A discussion of sets of larger size does not reveal qualitatively new cases.
Complete spatio-temporal overlap means tie. If locations of surfaces of
divergence do not intersect, it is always clear which history is to count
as closer — partial overlap does not change the verdict. If there is
intersection, our intuitions do not allow us to count one history as
closer than the other.
We thus arrive at the following definition of comparative closeness:18
Definition 7 (global comparative closeness)
Given histories f , g, and h and sets of choice points Cfh and Cgh, f is
strictly closer to h than g (f∠hg) iff
(1) Cfh 6= Cgh and (2) ∀c∈Cfh∃d∈Cgh d 6 c.
The first conjunct, Cfh 6= Cgh, prohibits total overlap of locations of
surfaces of divergence. The second conjunct prohibits the intersection
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of locations of surfaces of divergence, allowing for partial overlap (cf.
the 0-1 case and 1-2(A)). Notice that already by our decision on the
0-1 case, we opt for what Lewis calls ‘strong centering’: history h is
always considered closer to itself than any other history.
The global notion of comparative closeness requires one to take a
god’s eye view on all histories: the ordering is based on all histories
in their entirety. Many histories will be incomparable. In an actual
utterance of an historical counterfactual, only relatively few histories
matter—in fact, only those that branch off in the utterance event’s
causal past. Thus it makes sense to move from a global notion of
comparative closeness to a local notion that considerably narrows the
number of histories to be considered.
4.2. Local comparative closeness
For our local notion, we consider an utterance event e. The historical
alternatives from the point of view of e are exactly those histories that
branch off from e’s histories in the causal past of e. Thus, for each pair
of histories f and g of W with the set of choice points Cfg, we define
the pruned set of choice points
Cefg
df
= {c ∈ Cfg | c < e}.
Our definition of local comparative closeness with respect to e (∠eh)
runs exactly like Definition 7 above:
Definition 8 (local comparative closeness)
Given an utterance event e, histories f , g, and h and pruned sets of
choice points Cefh and C
e
gh, f is strictly closer to h than g (f∠
e
hg) iff
(1) Cefh 6= C
e




gh d 6 c.
5. The formal language and its semantics
In the last two sections we developed the resources that can be used
to specify truth conditions of counterfactuals in a formal language: We
have available BST+L+A-structures 〈W,6, L,P, A〉 with S
df
= W/L
isomorphic to Minkowski space-time, and we may employ the local
comparative closeness ordering ∠eh. We will now specify the formal
language syntactically (section 5.1) and then semantically (section 5.2).
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5.1. Syntax
As we mentioned above, the language we employ is inherently indexical.
Sentences will be evaluated at an index of utterance. In line with Prior-
Thomason semantics, the index consists both of an event of utterance
e ∈W and a history of evaluation h such that e ∈ h.19
(AT) Atomic sentences are propositional constants p, to be interpreted
as “p here and now”. (Thus, properties of events are expressed as
propositions true or false at events.) It will be enough to have at
most countably many such constants.
Complex sentences are built out of atomic ones by the following means:
(TF) The standard truth-functional connectives.
(S) A family of (one-place) translation operators, taking us from a point
of evaluation to a different point: For each vector s ∈ S, we have
an operator [+s]. (These operators are self-dual.)
(PF) The two (one-place) weak tense operators, P and F . (Their strong






(CF) The (two-place) counterfactual conditional, 2→.
5.2. Semantics
A model M is a BST+L+A structure 〈W,6, L,P, A〉 together with
an interpretation I that specifies, for each propositional constant p, a
property I(p) ∈ P. We evaluate a sentence φ in a model M at index
e, h, as explained above. The recursive semantic clauses are as follows:
(AT) If φ is atomic p, then M, e, h |= φ iff I(p) ∈ A(e). I.e., an atomic
sentence p is true at e (the history of evaluation, h, plays no role
here) iff the property I(p) applies to e.
(TF) The clauses for the truth-functional connectives are the standard
ones.
(S) If φ = [+s]ψ, s ∈ S, then M, e, h |= φ iff M, e′, h |= ψ, where e′
is the event in history h whose space-time distance to e is s. This
spells out the meaning of [+s] as a translation operator.
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(PF) If φ = Pψ, then M, e, h |= φ iff M, e, h |= [+s]ψ for some past-
directed timelike or lightlike s ∈ S, i.e., iff there is a translation
to an event e′ in e’s causal past such that at e′, h, ψ is true.—The
clause for the future operator F is exactly analogous, replacing
“past-directed” by “future-directed”.
As to the counterfactual conditional, we develop the semantic clause in
two steps. In the first step, we temporarily subscribe to what is called
the “limit assumption”, which says that for any actual scenario and
any antecedent sentence, there is a unique closest scenario making the
antecedent true. In our framework, this assumption amounts to the
following: For each index e, h and for each sentence ψ1, there is, with
respect to the local comparative closeness ordering ∠eh, a unique closest
history h′(e, h, ψ1) such that ψ1 is true at e
′, h′, where e′ is the event
in h′ that is at the same location as e. Given this assumption, our
semantic clause looks as follows:
(CF*) If φ = ψ1 2→ ψ2, then M, e, h |= φ iff M, e
′, h′ |= ψ2, where
h′ = h′(e, h, ψ1) is the closest history making ψ1 true and e
′ is as
just explained.
Since the limit assumption is controversial, we had better not assume it.
Our official semantic clause is based on Lewis’s (1981) analysis, since
the local comparative closeness ordering ∠eh is a partial ordering as
presupposed there:20
(CF) If φ = ψ1 2→ ψ2, then M, e, h |= φ iff for any history h1 s.t.
M, e1, h1 |= ψ1, there is some history h2 s.t.M, e2, h2 |= ψ1 and (1)
h1 = h2 or h2∠hh1, and (2) for any history h3 such that h2 = h3 or
h3∠hh2 for which M, e3, h3 |= ψ1, we have M, e3, h3 |= ψ2.—Here,
ei is the event in history hi that is at the same location as e.
For most practical purposes it will be appropriate to think of the clause
(CF*) and rest assured that cases in which the limit assumption fails
are handled correctly.
A worked-out example Assume that five minutes ago, you looked
in the fridge and found no cheese. Now you say to your friend:
If I had found some cheese, I would offer it to you now.(5)
In order to assess this counterfactual, you need to know the modal
facts, which are these: In the morning, you deliberated whether to go
to the shop and buy some cheese: you could have bought some cheese
and put it in the fridge, but you did not. Yesterday, as a matter of fact



















Figure 3. The cheese story. History h with the event e of utterance, choice point b?
(buy the cheese in the morning or not) and choice point l? (leave the rancid cheese
in the fridge or not). The antecedent (“I found some cheese”) and the consequent
(“I offer it to you now”) are true at e′, h′, and h′∠ehh
′′. Shadowed regions indicate
where h and a given history overlap.
you cleaned the fridge and threw out a piece of rancid cheese, but you
could have left the piece where it was. Figure 3 shows the correspond-
ing branching model, which contains three histories. In assessing the
counterfactual (5), let us assume that you belong to the amiable class
of people who never offer rancid cheese to friends. The counterfactual
is evaluated at event e in history h. The antecedent is true both at e′, h′
and at e′′, h′′, but the consequent is only true at e′, h′. The definition of
local comparative closeness yields the verdict h′∠ehh
′′: due to the spatio-
temporal location of the choice points between histories h, h′ and h, h′′,
respectively, history h′ (in which you bought fresh cheese this morning)
is closer to actuality than history h′′ (in which you found the rancid
cheese in your fridge). Thus, the counterfactual is true at e, h.
6. Discussion
Our formal analysis shows that historical and non-historical counter-
factuals need to be treated separately if rigor is wanted at least for
some of them. In non-historical cases like the ruby example (2), the
resources presupposed in our analysis are simply not available, while in
historical cases like the betting example (1), the additional rigor may
help to clarify some controversial aspects.
6.1. A closer look at the betting case
Recall the betting example: U bet on heads, the coin showed tails, and
the counterfactual utterance, “If the coin had shown heads I would have
won my bet”, is widely accepted as a true historical counterfactual: In
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the closest history h′ in which at e′ ∈ h′, the antecedent is true (“the
coin showed heads”), the consequent is also true (“I won my bet”).
There is, however, a controversy concerning the quite similar coun-
terfactual, uttered in the same circumstances:21
If I had bet on tails, I would have won my bet.(6)
Intuitively, most people hold that this is true, assuming that the out-
come of the toss is independent of the act of betting. However, many
theories of counterfactuals, including Lewis’s, give the opposite verdict
and hold that the counterfactual is false. Our theory can be employed







































Figure 4. Two models of the betting story. At the top: betting occurs before
tossing—h′ and h′′ are equally close to h and the counterfactual (6) comes out false
at e, h. At the bottom: betting and tossing are space-like separated events—h′∠ehh
′′
and the counterfactual comes out true at e, h.
The theoretical verdict proclaiming the counterfactual to be false
comes about as follows: The closest history at which the antecedent is
true (“I bet on tails”) is one that branches off from the actual history
at the actual betting event. The tossing is after this, and in the history
in which U bet on tails as well as in the actual history, the toss is
an indeterministic event with two possible outcomes. None of these is
preferred in any way (even though in the actual history, the coin did
show tails). Thus, it is not the case that in all the closest histories in
which U bet on tails, the coin showed tails.
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Against this analysis, the intuitive verdict holds that since the bet-
ting and the tossing are independent, in the closest history with U
betting on tails, the coin should still have shown tails, as it actually
did.
In the framework of branching space-times there is a formally precise
notion of such independence, namely space-like relation. While it is
true that in actual betting cases, space-like relatedness of betting and
tossing can hardly be realized,22 a model that pictures these two events
as space-like related correctly reproduces the way we intuitively think
about the setup. Figure 4 shows the difference between the two types
of model. If betting and tossing are pictured as space-like related, the
counterfactual (6) comes out true: history h′ (U betting on tails, coin
showing tails as it actually did) is closer to the actual history than
history h′′, and at e′, h′, the consequent of the counterfactual is true.
6.2. Fragility
In branching space-times, a given event e ∈ W cannot happen at a
different space-time location, nor in a manner different from the way
it actually did. To make things worse, if an event occurs, its whole
past is fixed uniquely. In the terminology of Lewis (1986, 196), BST
events are fragile. Fragility is usually considered problematic. Suppose
that I am having a cup of coffee now, and an hour ago, in Australia
a certain person in fact waved her arm (this takes place in the causal
past, or backward light cone, of my having my coffee). Suppose that the
person could have refrained from waving her arm. Through interference
with some solar neutrinos, say, this might have altered the trajectory
of one of the water molecules in my cup. Accordingly, if the person in
Australia hadn’t waved her arm, I could not have had my coffee the
way I did; the actual event of my having my coffee would not have
occurred.23 This sounds weird.24
In pure BST we can only talk about events occurring or not oc-
curring, so the above verdict may seem unavoidable. However, there
are two options for specifying events in a non-fragile way. First, one
can specify so-called disjunctive events, which are sets of point events
not overlapped by a single history. The disjunctive event occurs iff
one of its members occurs, i.e., it can occur in many ways (cf. Belnap
(2005) for details). Thus, in the coffee case, one may take the event
of having one’s coffee to be disjunctive and argue that the particular
(disjunctive) event of my having my morning coffee would still occur,
no matter whether the Australian waved her arm or not. While this
avoids the fragility problem, one may wonder how one should justify
the particular set that is used in specifying the disjunctive event. The
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second option therefore uses the properties that were added to pure
BST (cf. section 3.2 above) in order to provide a justification. Relative
to a given description in terms of some properties, the actual event and
many once-possible events will count as “the same thing”—arguably, no
description can be exhaustive. E.g., relative to an everyday description,
I would still be having my morning coffee in the same particular way,
no matter whether the coffee was a little warmer or colder, whether I
was drinking from this or from another mug, or whether I was sitting
differently, etc. The Australian’s waving her arm will obviously not
make any difference to the event so conceived.
6.3. Late departure: The coat story
Our definition of comparative closeness subscribes to a principle that
is known as “late departure”:25 histories are the closer the later they
branch. This principle is operative in other treatments of counterfactu-
als as well, cf., e.g., Lewis (1986, 47f., 58ff.) and Bennett (2003, 220).
The principle faces the following notorious objection:26
My coat was not stolen from the restaurant where I left it. There
were two chances for theft [...]. They would have involved different
potential thieves: and the candidate for the later theft is a rogue
who always sells his stuff to a pawnbroker named Fence.
If the closest A-world involves the latest admissible fork, it follows
from the above story that if my coat had been stolen from the restau-
rant, it would now be in Fence’s shop. That is not acceptable.
(Bennett 2003, 219f.; emphasis in original)
We have to confess that our treatment leads to the same verdict. In
line with Bennett and others, we agree that in some cases, an intu-
itively acceptable comparative closeness ordering cannot be based on
spatio-temporal considerations alone, but it seems that this phenom-
enon escapes formal treatment.
6.4. A remark on the “analytical circle”
What sort of elucidation can we hope to achieve through an analysis
of the truth conditions of counterfactuals? As Lewis (1986, 43) has
conceded, his analysis has to employ what may be called an “analytical
circle”: from intuitively known truth values of counterfactuals to the
assessment of similarity back to the truth value of counterfactuals. This
circularity is a ubiquitous feature of philosophical analysis, and our
analysis is not completely free from it either. However, it is an advan-
tage of our analysis that the circle has at least become larger. We derive
the truth value of counterfactuals from verdicts about similarity, but
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these are based not on counterfactual statements, but on the appraisal
of what was historically possible. In some cases, we will know what was
historically possible only through the truth of some counterfactuals,
but there are other, independent sources too, like generalizations from
experiments or symmetry considerations.
7. Summary
We have argued that while no all-encompassing, rigorous analysis of
counterfactuals seems to be forthcoming, rigor is possible for the class
of historical counterfactuals that plays an important role in everyday
arguments as well as in scientific contexts. Historical counterfactuals
are based on historical possibility. We elucidated both the notion of
historical possibility and the notion of historical counterfactuals in
the framework of branching space-times. Following the lead of many
other analyses of counterfactuals, the semantics was based on a simi-
larity relation, here called “comparative closeness”. This notion could
be defined fully rigorously in the branching space-times framework,
consequently allowing for more or less standard semantic clauses that
are no longer vague.
By widening the “analytical circle”, our analysis is not just formally
more rigorous than existing treatments of counterfactuals, but also
philosophically more dependable.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Nuel Belnap and Geert Keil for helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft of this paper. We also thank audiences at
Bonn and at Krako´w for comments on related talks, and two anony-
mous referees for their helpful comments. Financial support by the
State’s Committee of Research (KBN), grant no. 2H01A 023 25, is
acknowledged.
Appendix
A. Belnap’s analysis of counterfactuals in “pure event”
branching space-times
Nuel Belnap (2005) proposed an alternative analysis of counterfactu-
als, which is carried out in basic branching space-times only. Since
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he links true counterfactual-like statements to facts about originating
causes of corresponding events, there is an affinity between historical
counterfactuals and statements amenable to this analysis.
The language of basic BST is austere, fucussing on occurrence propo-
sitions, i.e., propositions stating that a given event occurs. In BST there
are a few kinds of events. In what follows we need, apart from a point
event, an outcome chain O, defined as a non-empty and lower bounded
chain of point events from W .
In the spirit of possible-worlds theories, occurrence propositions are
identified with appropriate sets of histories. The occurrence proposition
for a point event e is the set H(e) = {h ∈ Hist | e ∈ h}. The occurrence
proposition for an outcome chain O is H〈O〉 = {h ∈ Hist | O ∩ h 6= ∅}.
We say that a proposition is true in h iff h belongs to this proposition.
To explain some auxiliary notions, we write e < O iff ∀x(x ∈ O →
e < x). g ⊥e h means that e is a choice point for histories g and h.
For H a set of histories, h ⊥e H
df
↔ ∀h2 (h2 ∈ H → h ⊥e h2). For
undividedness ≡e of Definition 3 and H a set of histories, h ≡e H
df
↔
∀h2(h2 ∈ H → h ≡e h2).
One of Belnap’s aims in his (2005) is to identify what he calls origi-
nating causes, or causae causantes, of a given outcome chain O. He first
singles out choice points in the past of O at which histories that avoid
O could be ‘selected’. He calls the set of such choice points past causal
loci for O, defined as: pcl(O) = {e | e < O and ∃h h ⊥e H〈O〉}. For
each e, the relation ≡e of undividedness at e determines a partition Πe
of the set H(e). Given e < O, here is a single element of Πe containing
some histories that intersect non-emptily with O, that is, histories in
which O occurs. This single element, Πe〈O〉, is called the projection
of O onto e, and is defined as: Πe〈O〉
df
= {h ∈ H(e) | h ≡e H〈O〉}.
The pair consisting of a past causal locus e for O and the projection
Πe〈O〉 of O onto e is written e Πe〈O〉; it is called a basic transition.
Basic transitions e Πe〈O〉, where e is a pcl for O, are identified with
originating causes of O.
What is then the occurrence proposition for transition e Πe〈O〉?
Belnap argues for the ‘material implication’ sense of this proposition,
that is, the following: The occurrence proposition for e  Πe〈O〉 is
true in history h iff if h ∈ H(e), then h ∈ Πe〈O〉. By the definition of
‘material implication’, this means that e O occurs in h iff e 6∈ h or
h ∈ Πe〈O〉.—Given this sense of occurrence propositions for transitions,
it follows that a basic transition e Πe〈O〉 is an inns condition for O,
i.e., an insufficient but non-redundant part of a necessary and sufficient
condition for O.
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Having introduced the machinery, we may now take up Belnap’s
(2005) account of counterfactuals in pure BST. He agrees with Lewis
and others in pointing out a strong link between counterfactual condi-
tionals and strict conditionals. E.g., Lewis (1973) asserts this link and
goes on to argue that counterfactuals need to be interpreted as variably
strict conditionals, where the variability is guided by some similarity
considerations. Belnap denies that there can be an objective theory of
the necessary variability.
He first shows that some important subjunctive conditionals may
be given a BST reading as simple strict conditionals without any vari-
ability. Consider an outcome event O and one of its causae causantes,
e Πe〈O〉. It follows straight from the definitions of “inns condition”
that if e Πe〈O〉 hadn’t occurred, O wouldn’t have occurred. There is
no need for an elaborate account of counterfactuals here. We are even
entitled to conclude that . . . O wouldn’t have occurred, but some other
alternative Πe〈h〉 would have occurred, just on the basis of the “material
implication” reading of the occurrence proposition for e Πe〈O〉.
In a second step, Belnap allows for a notion of similarity to enter
the picture: It makes (objective) sense to grade the alternatives in
H(e) with respect to their similarity to actuality (i.e., O occurring) by
considering the other originating causes of O as well. Thus, a history
in which e  Πe〈O〉 is the only originating cause of O that fails is
in some good sense closer to actuality than a history in which two
or more of the originating causes fail.27 Still, one arrives at a strict
conditional reading of counterfactuals that Belnap takes to be only
slightly more illuminating than the first one. In the end, his advice
is to exclude counterfactuals from objective theories, reserving their
use to “sportscasters and military historians” (R.K. Meyer). In their
place, objective theories should only rely on explicitly formulated strict
conditionals.
We fully agree with Belnap’s verdict as far as pure BST is concerned.
However, even pure BST has the resources to define similarity orderings
(“comparative closeness”) that are more general than counting causae
causantes. We have shown that based on two slight extensions of BST,
these orderings can be employed to give rigorously defined truth condi-
tions for informative counterfactuals. Thus, pace Belnap, there seems
to be room for counterfactuals in objective theories.
Notes
1 Stalnaker (1968) uses A > C for the same purpose.
2 “Iff” stands for “if and only if”.
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3 Historically, the first analysis of counterfactuals by Goodman (1947) followed a
different guiding idea. Bennett (2003) labels Goodman’s approach “support theory”,
to be distinguished from the “world theory” approach of Stalnaker, Lewis, and oth-
ers, which is the focus of this paper. Roughly, in a support theory,A 2→ C is taken to
be true iff there is a true proposition S (“support”) and a law-statement L such that
A&S&L implies C. Certainly not any S qualifies—take ¬A, and all counterfactuals
come out true. Thus, Goodman and his followers require S to be cotenable with
A, which notion requires further analysis. There is quite some disagreement as to
whether Goodman’s approach can be made to work. If so, that would facilitate the
analysis of causal independence (cf., e.g., example sentence (6) below). However, we
agree with Bennett, whose careful analysis of the Goodman approach (Bennett 2003,
Chap. 20 and § 129) shows convincingly that support theories face insurmountable
difficulties. Thus, we continue our discussion solely in the “world theory” framework.
4 What we call “historical possibilities” may also be called “real possibilities”; cf.
Lewis (1999, 423) and Xu’s (1997) phrase “possibilities based on reality”.
5 If you are not convinced by this “large scale” example, use your favorite quantum
mechanical example instead.
6 For a critical discussion of determinism and counterfactuals cf. Kvart (1986,
178f., 256ff.), who also strongly favors indeterminism.
7 Maybe Lewis believed that he had to hold on to determinism because he thought
that there was no well worked-out theory of localized indeterminism—his letter,
quoted in Bennett (2003, 204), might suggest this. However, as we will show, branch-
ing space-times provides the necessary resources.
8 This will normally be the case, but not, e.g., if it was a trick coin whose two
sides both show tails. It depends on the coin that was actually used.
9 Difficult questions of identity criteria for individuals are involved. We assume
that at least for precious stones, the kind of stone constitutes part of its identity,
but maybe not, e.g., the cutting, and certainly not the question of whether there is
some dirt on its surface.
10 As we remarked in the previous note, difficult questions, e.g., regarding identity
or generalizations, may be involved, but these questions arise already independently
of the analysis of counterfactuals.
11 Note that in the technical sense of the theory of branching space-times to be
explained below, what is given by e is not a single history, but rather an initial
segment of a possibly large bundle of histories (which may diverge after e).
12 For Belnap’s postulates, cf. his (1992) paper; for a discussion and an alternative
set of postulates, cf. Placek (2003).
13 Cf. Mu¨ller (2002).
14 Note that not all models of BST permit locations in the above sense. For an
illustration, cf. Mu¨ller 2005.
15 Appendix A shows that BST alone is too austere a theory to permit informative
counterfactuals.
16 A similar intuition underlies the analysis of conditionals given by Thomason
and Gupta (1980). Our approach is both narrower, aiming only at a subclass of
counterfactuals and not at conditionals in general, and wider, incorporating the
spatial aspect. The latter allows us to escape some of the complications of the
Thomason/Gupta-analysis related to causal coherence. Furthermore, BSTmakes our
analysis applicable to a relativistic setting.—Arguably, this intuition has problematic
consequences. Cf. Section 6.3 below for discussion.
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17 Lewis (1973) based the semantics for counterfactuals on a family of weak order-
ings. He extended his analysis to families of partial orderings in his (1981), which is
the semantics that we will be using below.
18 Cf. the definition of ‘weak similarity’ in Placek (2005) and Mu¨ller (2002).
19 The best description of that framework known to us is given in Chap. 8 of
Belnap et al. (2001).
20 Cf. note 13 above.
21 Bennett (2003, 234f.), who attributes the example to Tichy´, describes some of
the controversy surrounding it.
22 On a typical distance between toss and bet of, say, 1 meter, this would mean
that betting and tossing have to occur within less than 3·10−9 seconds. Such margins
of precision have, however, been realized in some quantum-mechanical experiments:
cf., e.g., Weihs et al. (1998).
23 According to Lewis’s project of a counterfactual analysis of singular causation,
the truth of this counterfactual would mean that the Australian’s arm-waving causes
my drinking my coffee, which is obviously absurd.
24 In branching space-times, the fragility is even more extreme, since a mere differ-
ence of the causal past, without any physical interaction, will already differentiate
events.
25 Cf. Ma˚rtensson (2000, 79ff.).
26 The example is Pollock’s; cf. Nute (1980, 104). We follow the careful wording
of Bennett (2003, 219f.), which is immune against the charge that a backtracking
conditional is involved.
27 Since the spatiotemporal ordering plays no role for this notion of closeness, the
charge against “late departure” discussed in section 6.3 does not apply.
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